Abstract. This paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate. The latter consists of numerous groups of dominant-issue-voters who base their voting decision primarily on one issue of the political agenda. Parties follow a lexicographic objective function, aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions. The emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference, its extreme ends, occupied by dominant-issue-voters, attract the policy platforms. The difference in policy platforms is not reduced. The conclusions are found to be compatible with some major empirical findings of the Manifesto Research Group.
Introduction
In their voting decision in representative democracies, voters have to decide on numerous issues at the same time. The decisions made thereby have considerable influence on the voters' utility, though the extent to which the decision on a certain policy issue affects a voter's utility will differ across voters, depending on their individual situation. Different groups of voters can therefore be expected to emphasize on different parts of the political agenda when deciding which party to vote for. Congleton (1991) provides a model of the political decision making process which accounts for the heterogeneity in the electorate's preferences by introducing the notion of single-issue-voting. This paper will pick up his basic idea and develop another model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate. The model presented below differs from the approach taken by Congleton (1991) in two distinct features. First, the paper draws on the literature on party competition (especially, Denzau and Munger, 1986; Coughlin et al., 1990) to provide a richer model of party behavior. In particular, it accounts for the fact that parties have policy preferences (e.g., Wittman, 1983; Kalt and Zupan, 1984) . Second this paper * The author would like to thank Donald R. Wittman, Louis M. Imbeau, Bernhard Grofman and three anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
argues that voters who base their voting decision predominantly on one issue regularly have policy preferences which are at the extreme ends of the scale of preferences rather than in its centre. As a consequence, the emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms does not resemble the convergence as proposed by the spatial theory of voting. Instead, the platforms follow the attractive forces of dominant-issue voters and move in parallel rather than towards the centre and thus towards each other. Consequently, there is no mechanism which regularly reduces the distance between policy platforms in the course of the election race.
The paper starts by giving a brief overview on the existing literature on policy convergence in Section 2. Section 3 introduces political parties and voters as major agents of the political decision making process. The notion of dominant-issue-voters is introduced. Section 4 illustrates the consecutive pattern of movement in policy platforms that will emerge when political parties compete for the majority of votes before Section 5 relates the major findings of the model to the empirical observations in party competition.
Policy convergence in the spatial theory of voting -a review of literature
Though differing in the assumptions concerning e.g. the objective function of political parties or the composition and behavior of the electorate, all models following the spatial theory of voting have a number of common features (e.g., Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Merrill and Grofman, 1999) . 1 When modelling the political decision making process, they assign the central role to the political parties. In general, two parties following different ideologies or representing the interests of different constituencies of voters (e.g., Roemer, 1994) are assumed to compete for political power. In most models, the policy space is assumed to have only one dimension. This can either be the classical ideological left-wing / right wing scale. Alternatively, the scale can depict the preferred amount of a certain publicly provided good (e.g., Inman, 1978) or the preferred degree of income redistribution (e.g., Orr, 1976; Roemer, 1994) . Due to differences in ideology and policy preferences, the voters' bliss points will be dispersed across this political scale. The parties' bliss points are positioned in distinct distance to the median position of the relevant electorate. In addition, they are assumed to be on opposite sides of the median position (e.g., Enelow and Hinich, 1984: 8-14) . The starting point of their competition is marked by the situation in which both parties offer policy platforms in accordance with their bliss points. Regardless of their assumed objective function, both parties serve their own objective by offering policy platforms which are closer to the median voter's position than their own bliss
